Abstract
The purpose of this Comment is to call attention to the need to eliminate the definition of "serious emotional damage" as defined in North Carolina General Statutes section 7B-101(1)(e). This Comment uses a recent case from the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the ensuing denial of a petition for discretionary review by the Supreme Court to highlight how the statute invites parents to argue, in matters as sensitive and awful as child abuse, that the emotional damage inflicted upon a child is not severe enough. This Comment discusses the procedural processes for investigating instances of reported child abuse and making ultimate determinations of whether child abuse occurred. This Comment surveys the North Carolina Court of Appeals' interpretation of "serious emotional damage" again allowing for shocking arguments like the one made by the father in Azevedo. This Comment also surveys other jurisdictions to examine the ways in which they define child abuse, which, in turn, help us consider how North Carolina could define child abuse. Finally, this Comment proposes that the North Carolina General Assembly change its definition of child abuse. Specifically, this Comment proposes that, instead of the current definition, the general assembly should create a broader provision that encompasses mental or emotional injury. With the proposed change's enactment, petitioners like the father in Azevedo will not be able to argue that the emotional damage they inflicted upon their children was not severe enough.
Recommended Citation
George Sparks Bennett, Child Abuse by Serious Emotional Damage: An Invitation for Repulsive Arguments, 47 Campbell L. Rev. 199 (2026).