Abstract
For decades, many courts have wrestled with the judicially created concept of "adverse employment actions" in determining whether a plaintiffhas proved a primafacie case of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964. Circuit courts have regularly applied different types of heightened adverse employment action standards, which only muddied the already complicated understanding ofworkplace discrimination. This Comment explores the recent circuit split concerning adverse employment actions and the introduction of the Supreme Court's new "some harm" testfrom Muldrow v. City of St. Louis. This Comment takes the position that principal behavioral economics theories can inform the judicial system's understanding ofwhat it means to suffer harm in the context ofemployment discrimination and proposes a new standardfor adverse employment actions that incorporates those theories.
Recommended Citation
Janelle L. Ariota, The Inherent Harm of Employment Discrimination: What Behavioral Economics Teaches Us About Title VII's Adverse Action Requirement, 47 Campbell L. Rev. 77 ().