•  
  •  
 

Abstract

In Part I, I catalog the historical context in which the PCA was passed and describe the military events that are most commonly used to support the case for sharply divided civilian and military authorities. In Part II, I discuss the true purpose and intent of the PCA: to prohibit civilian marshals from calling forth active duty military to enforce domestic law. I also explore the contours of the emergency power doctrine to show that it is not clear that Congress could limit Executive action as a revamped PCA may attempt to do. Lastly, in Part III, I examine whether a PCA-like law is even necessary by discussing its commonly proffered justifications. Ultimately, I conclude that these justifications are flawed and that the PCA is unnecessary.

Share

COinS
 

To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.